L’Atlantic History face aux Area Studies, à l’Imperial History et à la Global History

Depuis plusieurs années, les débats autour de la définition des limites de l’Atlantique ont abouti à redéfinir le champ de l’Atlantic History par rapport à deux autres paradigmes : celui des Area Studies et celui de la Global History. Pour éclairer cela, il faut rappeler à quel point l’historiographie anglo-saxonne a résisté et résiste encore au modèle braudélien. En 1996, Bernard Bailyn écrit son désaccord avec Braudel, l’historien français n’ayant écrit qu’une « métahistoire »1). Puisque l’Atlantique est un monde en mouvement, l’analyse des structures formelles n’a pas de véritable intérêt ; il faut plutôt aborder l’espace atlantique à travers ses dynamiques, ses ruptures et ses transformations (ce qui se traduit en anglais par le concept d’agency). En somme, il s’agit de mettre en avant les méthodes de la Social Network Analysis. C’est ainsi que les historiens pourront reconstruire une histoire atlantique globale qui prenne en compte des processus globaux et rendre à chaque acteur géographique son rôle dans la formation de cette partie du monde.

Pour Bernard Bailyn, inspiré en cela par Donald William Meinig (The Shaping of America: A Geographical Perspective on 500 Years of History, 2004), l’histoire atlantique est d’abord un processus mené par des Hommes (marchands, colons, esclaves, missionnaires) dont les parcours dessinent un monde en mouvement permanent, complexe à étudier.

Pour Nicholas Canny et Philip Morgan (The Oxford Handbook of the Atlantic World 1450-1850, Oxford University Press, 2013), le principal défaut de l’analyse des structures est qu’elle impose une forme de déterminisme géographique au sein duquel les acteurs historiques seraient forcément emprisonnés. Or, c’est négliger la part d’adaptation et d’inventivité des êtres humains face aux contraintes qu’ils rencontrent. Braudel n’aurait donc pas tenu compte des capacités d’adaptation des individus, ni de leur « agentivité »2. Si les Hommes étaient restés soumis aux vents et aux forces naturelles, les navigateurs n’auraient jamais exploré le monde ; il n’y aurait jamais eu de voyages de découvertes vikings, chinois, polynésiens, portugais ou espagnols !

Pour les historiens travaillant en-dehors de l’influence des Annales, la conception des trois temps de la Méditerranée ne peut convenir qu’en Méditerranée ou dans l’océan Indien, où ont été mises en contact des civilisations différentes, mais qui étaient toutes en état de rivaliser efficacement l’une contre l’autre. Les rives étaient occupées et aménagées et les représentations mentales ainsi que les nécessités commerciales incitaient les populations à s’engager au-delà du rivage. Ces deux espaces maritimes pouvaient certes former un tout, et pouvait être abordé dans sa totalité (=la tendance holiste).

Pourtant, cette idée même d’unité méditerranéenne est critiquée par de nombreux travaux. Le célèbre ouvrage de Peregrine Horden et Nicholas Purcell, The Corrupting Sea : a Study of Mediterranean History (Wiley-Blackwell, 2006), et celui de Sugata Bose (A Hundred Horizons : the Indian Ocean in the Age of Global Empire, Harvard University Press, 2006) montrent que la Méditerranée comme l’océan Indien se décomposent en réalité en plusieurs micro-territoires. En 2005, David Abulafia prédit que les historiens anglo-saxons devront désormais renoncer au concept d’« unité régionale » en Méditerranée, pour se concentrer sur « an arena of interaction, of encounters and exchange »3. L’année suivante, Alison Games a apporté sa critique au modèle braudélien en rappelant la variété des environnements, des écosystèmes, des climats et des saisons « from the swath of the Sahara Desert to the tropical rainforests of equatorial regions to the tundra of Nunavut »4. Plus récemment, en 2018, Jonathan Miran écrit que « most maritime spaces are innately fractured, fragmented and unstable arenas »5.

S’il y unité entre les rives de la Méditerranée braudélienne, ce dont les historiens doutent à présent, il est évident qu’il n’en est pas de même pour l’espace atlantique à l’époque moderne6. Les Amérindiens et les Africains ne se sont jamais tournés vers l’océan. Les réseaux qui ont constitué le « monde atlantique » tel qu’il a été inventé par l’historiographie des années 1970, ne sont le fruit que des initiatives portugaises, espagnoles, hollandaises, françaises et britanniques. Ce faisant, les Européens n’ont jamais été confrontés à des civilisations qui leur aient véritablement résisté, comme l’ont fait les Ottomans en Méditerranée, les Malais et les Chinois en Insulinde. Ils ont ainsi pu construire leur propre système de relations interocéanique. Comme l’écrit John Elliott, « the Atlantic began its historical existence a European lake ».

Même s’ils ont été dominés pendant quatre siècles par les Européens, la reconnaissance de la diversité des mondes atlantiques apporte inévitablement une critique des approches holistes qui unifieraient artificiellement des mondes qui ne l’ont jamais été. Il semble donc que le modèle braudélien, rejeté par le monde universitaire anglo-saxon, doive être remplacé par autre chose. Cette tendance à fragmenter les grands espaces est à l’origine des Area Studies dans les années 1980.

NOTES:

1. « Meta-historical, not historical, based on a formulation essentially epistemological, not historical », Bernard Bailyn, « The Idea of Atlantic History », Itinerario, 20, 1996, p. 19-44, p. 20.
2. « While they make allowance for such environmental determinants, scholars who study the halting penetration of the Atlantic Ocean by mariners associated with trading ports in Western Europe give principal credit to human agency. Thus they attribute the ultimate success of European mariners in mastering and comprehending that ocean to a slow accumulation of knowledge and experience of particular sections of the Atlantic Ocean by those searching for fishing grounds, or seeking the source of African gold, or tracing an all-water route to Asia by the African coastline », Nicholas Canny et Philip Morgan, « The Making and Unmaking of an Atlantic World », dans Nicholas Canny et Philip Morgan (dir), The Oxford Handbook of the Atlantic World, 1450-1850, 2011, p. 6
3. David Abulafia, « Mediterranean », dans W. Harris (dir), Rethinking the Mediterranean, Oxford University Press, 2005.
4. Alison Games, « Atlantic History : Definitions, Challenges, and Opportunities », p. 742.
5. Jonathan Miran, « The Red Sea », dans David Armitage, Alison Bashford, Sujit Sivasundaram (dir), Oceanic Histories, Cambridge University Press, 2018, p. 156-181, p. 162
6. Nicholas Canny, « Atlantic History, 1492-1700 : Scope, Sources, and Methods », dans Horst Pietschmann (dir), Atlantic History : History of the Atlantic System, 1580-1830, Vandenhoeck &Ruprecht, 2002, p. 55-64; Bernard Bailyn, Sounding in Atlantic History, Harvard University Press, 2009 ; David Armitage, « Three Concepts of Atlantic History », dans David Armitage, Michael Braddick (dir), The British Atlantic World, 1500-1800, Palgrave McMillan, 2002, p. 11-27 ; John Elliott, « Atlantic History : a Circumnavigation », dans David Armitage, Michael Braddick (dir), The British Atlantic World, 1500-1800, Palgrave McMillan, 2002, p. 253-270 ; Lauren Benton, « The Atlantic in Global Perspective », dans David Armitage, Michael Braddick (dir), The British Atlantic World, 1500-1800, Palgrave McMillan, 2002, p. 271-289.
7. « The concept of a plantation complex calls attention to the ubiquity of a form of settlement that stretched across national and imperial boundaries and encompassed a substantial area of the Americas. Distinguishing plantation colonies from settlement colonies, in which the majority of the populations were of European origin, Philip D. Curtin defined the primary attributes of the former in a succinct volume published in 1990. These attributes included location in a tropical or semitropical and fertile space, the overwhelming predominance of unfree labor, a majority slave population that was non-self-sustaining and had to be replenished by continuing imports, organization of agricultural production around large-scale capitalist plantations, and a powerful focus on the production of staples for foreign export. Curtin finds the purest examples of this complex in the sugar colonies. Although Spaniards brought sugar culture from the Mediterranean and eastern Atlantic islands to Hispaniola and to New Spain during the first half of the sixteenth century, Brazil was the American place in which, during the last half of the sixteenth century, Europeans first worked out all the characteristics of the plantation complex, which spread to Barbados and other eastern Caribbean islands during the last half of the seventeenth century and from thence to the Greater Antilles, where during the century after 1690 Jamaica and St. Domingue became its fullest expressions before the early nineteenth century. At the same time, this plantation culture spread in modifi ed form onto both the South American and North American mainlands. If it centered in the Caribbean, Brazil and the North American Southeast functioned as parallel continental sites for its extension into the rest of the Americas. Indeed, it proved to be highly adaptable for the production of agricultural staples other than sugar, for forest industries, and even for ranching, and it subsequently spread into the mining areas of Peru and New Granada, where the supply of Indian labor was diminishing, and, following the discovery of gold in the 1690s and diamonds a few decades later, into Minas Gerais in Brazil […]. Insofar as the employment of African slaves on large units of production was the central feature of the plantation complex, there seem to have been few limits on its utility in the early modern Americas. Following Philip D. Morgan, however, it may be useful to make a distinction between slave colonies, where slaves provided a high proportion of the labor force and constituted a substantial segment of the population, and slave-owning colonies, where slaves supplied only a fraction of the labor and were a distinct minority of the population, albeit in both types of colonies slavery was protected and regulated by law. This distinction is similar to the one Curtin made between settlement colonies and plantation colonies », Jack Greene, « Early Modern Southeastern North America and the Broader Atlantic and American Worlds », Journal of Southern History, 73, 2007, p. 525-538, p. 534.
8. Ian Steele, « Exploding Colonial American History : Amerindian, Atlantic, and Global Perspectives », Review in American History, 26, 1998, p. 70-95 ; Jack Greene, « Comparing Early Modern American Worlds : Some Reflections on the Promise of a Hemispheric Perspective », History Compass, 1, 2003 ; John Elliott, Empires of the Atlantic World : Britain and Spain in America, 1492-1830, Yale University Press, 2007 ; Jorge Cañizares-Esguerra, « Entangled Histories : Borderland Historiographies in New Clothes ? », American Historical Review, 112, 2007, p. 787-799.
9. David Armitage, « Three Concepts of Atlantic History », in David Armitage et Michael J. Braddick (dir), The British Atlantic World, 1500-1800, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2002, p. 13-29, p. 13.
10. « One of the impetuses behind my book on the US Declaration of Independence was precisely to show that this most American of American documents was fundamentally international, even global : if one could globalise the Declaration, then there was no reason not to globalise the rest of American history—by which I mean, as most of its practitioners mean, United-States-ian history. Even in its physical make up the Declaration was an international object, printed by an Irishman, using a printing press and type imported from England. Moreover, he printed it on Dutch paper. There were no paper manufacturers in British North America in the 1770s. The US would not become self-sufficient in paper production until the early nineteenth century. Even the paper the Declaration was written on had to be imported. The inkstand used to sign the manuscript was made of silver not from the mines of Virginia, but probably from the mines of Peru. So it does not take very much to show the international connections, even in the Declaration’s physical fabric », Martine van Ittersum et Jaap Jacobs, « Are We All Global Historians Now ? An Interview with David Armitage », Itinerario, 36, 2012, p. 7-28, p. 17.
11. David Armitage, « The Atlantic Ocean », dans David Armitage, Alison Bashford, Sujit Sivasundaram (dir), Oceanic Histories, Cambridge University Press, 2018, p. 85-110, p. 88.
12. David Eltis, « Atlantic History in Global Perspective », Itinerario, 23, 1999, p. 141-161 ; Numéro spécial « The Nature of Atlantic History », Itinerario, 23, 1999, p. 48-173 (actes du colloque organisé à l’Université de Leyde par Pieter Emmer) ; Alison Games, « Atlantic History : Definitions, Challenges, and Opportunities », American Historical Review, 111, 2006, p. 741-757 ; Donna Gabaccia, « A Long Atlantic in a Wider World », Atlantic Studies, 1, 2004, p. 1-27 ; Patrick Griffin, « A Plea for a New Atlantic History », The William and Mary Quarterly, 68, 2011, p. 236-239 ; Richard Blakemore, « The changing fortunes of Atlantic history », English Historical Review, 131, 2016, p. 851-868 ; Michelle Craig McDonald, « There Are Still Atlanticists Now ; A Subfield Reborn », Journal of the Early Republic , 36, 2016, p. 701-713. Peter Coclanis, « Atlantic World or Atlantic/World ? », The William and Mary Quarterly, 63, 2006, p. 725-742. Aussi Elliott a circumnavigation ?
13. David Armitage, « The Atlantic Ocean », dans David Armitage, Alison Bashford, Sujit Sivasundaram (dir), Oceanic Histories, Cambridge University Press, 2018, p. 85-110, p. 87-88. David Armitage cite ici John Elliott, « Atlantic History : a Circumnavigation », dans David Armitage et Michael Braddick (dir), The British Atlantic World, 1500-1800, Macmillan, 2002, p. 253-270, p. 259.
14. « For example, differences in the ways of Europeans and Africans saw themselves made the transatlantic slave trade possible in the sense that Europeans would not enslave other Europeans by the end of the Middle Ages. Sub-Saharan Africans by contrast still defined those sufficiently different from themselves to warrant enslavement as occupying much smaller geographic area than did Europeans. Thus both Europans and some Africans could agree to buy and sell slaves », David Eltis, « Atlantic History in Global Perspective », Itinerario, 23, 1999, p. 141-161, p. 145. David Eltis s’inspire ici des travaux de Philip Curtin, Steven Feierman, Leonard Thompson, Jan Vansina, Suzanne Miers, Igor Kopytoff, Orlando Patterson, Richard Price, José Curto (cités dans les notes 6, 14 et 21).
15. « These relationships between lucre and State within polities inevitably produced repercussions outside them. European overseas ventures, to sustain themselves, usually had to be profitable to someone, to promise profits, protect profits somewhere else, or diminish the profits of a rival. Because government revenues derived from these, profits could be transformed into military might with which to prey on neighboring nations, Europeans states could not ignore the implications of the oceanic commerce and colonial ventures of their fellows », Paul Mapp, « Atlantic History from Imperial, Continental and Pacific Perspectives », The William and Mary Quarterly, 63, 2006, p. 713-724, p. 724.
16. John Brewer, The Sinews of Power : War, Money, and the English State, 1688-1783, Oxford University Press, 1988 ; Steven Pincus, 1688 : the First Modern Revolution, Yale University Press, 2009. Sur l’Etat militaro-fiscal, voir aussi Patrick O’Brien et Philip Hunt « The Rise of a Fiscal State in England », Historical research, 1993, p. 129-176 ; Michael Braddick, The Nerves of State : Taxation and the Financing of the English State, 1588-1714, Manchester University Press, 1996 ; Michael Braddick, State Formation in Early Modern England, 1550-1700, Cambridge UP, 2000 ; Christopher Orrs (dir), The Fiscal Military State in the Long Eighteenth Century Europe, Ashgate, 2009 ; Aaron Graham, Patrick Walsh (dir), The British Fiscal-Military States, 1660-1783, Routledge, 2016.
17. « Atlantic perspectives deepen our understanding of transformations over a period of several centuries, cast old problems in an entirely new light, and illuminate connections hitherto obscured.’ This approach sees the Atlantic not as a coherent and unified historical object, but as messy and multidimensional, integrally connected to many other parts of the world: ‘Atlantic history, then, is a slice of world history. . . . that region was not, of course, hermetically sealed off from the rest of the world… like other maritime regions, the Atlantic can offer a useful laboratory within which to examine regional and global transformations.’ No single interpretive framework or methodological brief can hope to make sense of an Atlantic experience that instead ‘points to the importance of flexibility in understanding and interpreting changes within the region. They will be generated by historians who work deliberately to integrate their particular findings into a larger unit, who read broadly, who are open to interdisciplinary approaches, and who are committed to moving beyond parochial frameworks dictated by conventional historiographic divisions toward an Atlantic perspective. Writing Atlantic history requires considerable optimism, fearlessness, and the conviction that a leap into the ocean will not end tragically in a wrecked heap in the Bermuda triangle, but rather will land you safely in a new, unexpected, and stimulating place » (« Atlantic History : Definitions, Challenges, and Opportunities », American Historical Review, 111, 2006, p. 741-757, p. 757).
18. H. Bowen, Elites, Enterprise and the Making of the British Overseas Empire, 1688-1775, Palgrave MacMillan, 1996.
19. « At the center of this vigorous global expansion were individuals who took part in commercial and colonial ventures around the globe. The travels and experiences of these people offered a new style of empire building. The English Empire was not constructed and shaped at the impérial center. Rather it was an empire built on the ground, in the périphéries, in colonies and trade factories, on islands and in port towns, aboard ships and within fortifications. It was an empire whose ultimate configuration depended nor on the cohérent vision imposed by a monarch or the Board of Trade but instead on the expériences of men who lived around the globe in a sériés of overseas experiments. Models devised in different colonial and commercial settings were subsequently adapred and transported around the globe by men whose travels tangibly linked one enterprise to another », Alison Games, « Beyond the Atlantic : English Globetrotters and Transoceanic Connections », The William and Mary Quarterly, 63, 2006, p. 675-692, p. 692.
20. « The experiences of Rolfe, Wise, and Goad suggest that there was a large population of people who were very confused about what it was they were doing in boarding ships for the colonies. There were certainly many less-confused people, educated men and women who read the numerous promotional pamphlets about the colonies, who corresponded with friends overseas, who interrogated returning travelers, who did as much research as one could do before venturing overseas, but even these more sophisticated trav elers did not always stay in their first colonial destination […]. What all this movement suggests is that the differences between regions that stand out so dramatically in descriptions of the colonial world were differences that contemporaries may have acknowledged, but they certainly were not distinctions that persuaded many English men and women that they could not enjoy equal access to the possible wealth in newly settled lands. Any approach to the colonial world which focuses on single regions with in the diversity of British colonization efforts in the Atlantic overlooks the important ways in which the colonial world was composednot of isolated subcultures but of interlocking and overlapping communities. Furthermore, this movement makes clear the extent to which oceans were not barriers but, rather, bridges, in this formative period of colonial development. The movement of colonial resitive period of colonial development. The movement of colonial residents and visitors should serve as an important reminder to Americanists of the variables shaping new world societies, and it Americanists of the variables shaping new world societies, and it should above all serve as a caution to those who would let the regional dichotomies cherished in early American historiography blind them to the larger forces shaping settlement, colonization, and migration in the Atlantic basin. The colonial world was one characterized by movement across the Atlantic and between colonies. The circular tours these Atlantic migrants took of the colonial world reaffirmed their continuing ties values and expectations of metropolitan society. The Atlantic migrants, furthermore, symbolize the dynamic nature of the early colonial world and, in moving from colony to colony, suggest that we discard models of American development that emphasize the experience of any one region. From the perspective of the immigrants themselves, this was truly an Atlantic world in which many of those who were poor, desperate, or brave enough to cross the ocean once were undaunted by the prospect of subsequent migrations by land or sea. Teachers of American history should take their example to heart », Alison Games, « History Without Borders : Teaching American History in an Atlantic Context », Indiana Magazine of History, 91, 1995, p. 159-178, p. 177-178.
21. « Cis-Atlantic history is the most accessible way for historians, particularly graduate students eager to research and write a manageable dissertation, to get into an Atlantic perspective, since it is less likely to require archival research in multiple languages and countries. There are numerous good examples of local histories oriented toward the Atlantic. April Lee Hatfield’s Atlantic Virginia : Intercolonial Relations in the Seventeenth Century privileges English, Dutch, and indigenous economic and cultural interactions, depicting a Virginia vastly different from the one that has emerged over the past three decades from a historiography addicted to tobacco. Hatfield argues that we cannot understand the development of one place, in this instance colonial Virginia, without looking well beyond that place, across the Atlantic, to the complex variables and interactions that converged to produce a particular set of local conditions », Alison Games, « Atlantic History : Definitions, Challenges, and Opportunities », American Historical Review, 111, 2006, p. 741-757, p. 746.
22. John Elliott, « Atlantic History : a Circumnavigation », dans David Armitage et Michael Braddick (dir), The British Atlantic World, 1500-1800, Macmillan, 2002, p. 253-270, p. 267.
23. « These brief comparisons offer reasons to chink that chartered colonial enterprises on both sides of the world may hâve shared much in common. In this sense historians of early Virginia and early Bombay can learn a great deal from one another. That these commercial and political efforts were functions of corporations and proprietorships with similar forms and ideological foundations opens up for historians of either side of the world a host of possibilities for revising their own subjects and the narratives of empire that inform them », Philip Stern, « British Asia and British Atlantic : Comparisons and Connections », The William and Mary Quarterly, 63, 2006, p. 693-712, p. 705. Voir aussi, à propos de Josiah Child, « The World-System East of Longitude 20° : the European Role in Asia, 1500-1750, Review of the Fernand Braudel Center, 5, 1981, p. 219-245 ; Elizabeth Mancke, « Chartered Enterprises and the Evolution of the British Atlantic World », dans Elisabeth Mancke, Carole Shammas (dir), The Creation of the British Atlantic World, Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005.
24. « Patersons vision of finding a European balance of power overseas would be rearticulated a half century later by Scottish Enlightenment thinkers, this time in India and among the English and French. By the mid-eighteenth century, politicians and historians had forgotten Patersons global ambitions. When the Darien plan itself was recycled within the British government in 1739, it was presented as an exclusively Atlantic issue : more a means of arresting Spanish power and prescribing “laws to the Kingdom of Peru and great part of Lima” than to “give laws to both the Océans.” Not much came of this scheme, and the full implications of Patersons original plan would not be realized until the mid nineteenth century », Philip Stern, « British Asia and British Atlantic : Comparisons and Connections », The William and Mary Quarterly, 63, 2006, p. 693-712, p. 705. Voir aussi George Pratt Insh, « The Founding of the Company of Scotland Trading to Africa and the Indies », Scottish Historical Review, 84, 1924, p. 288-295 ; George Pratt Insh, The Company of Scotland Trading to Africa and the Indies, Londres, 1932 ; David Armitage, « The Scottish Vision of Empire : Intellectual Origins of the Darien Venture », dans John Robertson (dir), A Union for Empire : Political Thought and the British Union of 1707, Cambridge University Press, 1995, p. 97-118 ; Ignacio Gallup-Diaz, The Door of the Seas and Key to the Universe: Indian Politics and Imperial Rivalry in the Darin, 1640-1750, Cambridge University Press, 2004 ; Andrew Mackillop, « Accessing Empire : Scotland, Europe, Britain, and the Asia Trade, 1695-1750 », Itinerario, 29, 2005, p. 7-30.
25. « As piracy continued to threaten Mughal interests in the 1690s, the company learned that its officiais in the Mughal port town of Surat had been arrested and put in irons by officiais there. Its trade was stopped in western Indian ports and, perhaps most troubling, British subjects began to rove freely in the East without company license. These circumstances helped produce a crisis of the company’s own political authority and sovereignty and supplied sufficient incentive for the company to try to direct the resources of the English state to its cause. In letters and petitions to the Board of Trade, the Privy Council, and the Court, the East India Company succeeded in persuading William III and his councilors that piracy was a problem. Importantly, however, company representatives articulated it nor just as a problem in the East but as a concern in the West as well […]. The threat pirates actually posed to late sevcnteenth century trade and empire was dramatically overblown by contemporaries. As a policical crisis, however, it was remarkably useful as an excuse to implement what was already an agenda of William III and his councilors : co extend further control over the American colonies […]. After the 1720s, the company was poised to find pirates among its two biggest remaining Asian maritime rivais, the Marathas of western India and the Qawasim, or so-called Musqat Arabs of the Arabian peninsula. The defeat of both in the mid- and late eighteenith century, along with the conquest of Bengal in the East, marked a new phase in the expansion of company (and British) power in India. This late eighteenth century company expansion across the Indian Océan in the name of pirate hunting may not have been possible without the precedents established in fighting American piracy in Asia in the late seventeenth century […]. In turn this resolution helped the British State to expand its authority at home and abroad and enabled the East India Company to do the same in Asia. In the particular case of piracy suppression, British politics in the Atlantic cannot be separated from the pressures of British politics in the East any more than the political and commercial conditions in New York or Providence Island can be divorced from the troubles faced by the East India Company in the 1690s » (Philip Stern, « British Asia and British Atlantic : Comparisons and Connections », The William and Mary Quarterly, 63, 2006, p. 693-712, p. 708-712). Voir aussi Ian Steele, Politics of Colonial Policy : the Board of Trade in Colonial Administration, Oxford University Press, 1968 ; Bradley Nutting, « The Madagascar Connection: Parliament and Piracy, 1690-1701 », American Journal of Legal History 22, 1978, p.202-215 ; Robert Rirchie, Captain Kidd and the War Against the Pirates, Harvard University Press, 1986 ; Muhammad Al-Qâsimâ, The Myth of Arab Piracy in the Gulf, Routledge, 1986 ; Janice Thomson, Mercenaries, Pirates, and Sovereigns : State-Building and Extraterritorial Violence in Early Modem Europe, Princeton University Press, 1994 ; Ashin Das Gupta, « India and the Indian Ocean in the Eighteenth Century » dans Ashin Das Gupta (dir), World of the Indian Ocean Merchant, 2001 ; Patricia Risso, « Cross-Cultural Perceptions of Piracy : Maritime Violence in the Western Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf Region during a Long Eighteenth Century » Journal of World History, 2001, p. 293-319.
26. Peter Coclanis, « Drang Nach Osten : Bernard Bailyn, the World-Island, and the Idea of Atlantic History », Journal of World History, 13, 2002, p. 169-182. L’auteur emprunte le concept de « World-Island » à Halford Mackinder, « The Geographical Pivot of History », Geographical Journal, 23, 1904, p. 421-437 et Democratic Ideals and Reality : a Study in the Politics of Reconstruction, 1919, où il est écrit l’axiome « Who rules East Eurpoe commands the Heartland ; who rules the heartland commands the World-Island ; who rules the World-Island commands the world ».
27. Peter Coclanis cite plusieurs travaux : Joseph Miller, « A Marginal Institution on the Margin of the Atlantic System : The Portuguese Southern Atlantic Slave Trade in the Eighteenth Century », dans Barbara Solow (dir), Slavery and the Rise of the Atlantic System, Cambridge University Press, 1993, p. 120-150 ; William Lytle Schurz, The Manila Galleon, 1939 ; Dennis Flynn and Arturo Giraldez, « China and the Manila Galleons », dans A.J.H. Latham, Heita Kawakatsu, Japanese Industrialization and the Asian Economy, Routledge, 1994, p. 71-90 ; Dennis Flynn et Arturo Giraldez, « Born with a Silver Spoon : the Origins of World Trade in 1571 », Journal of World History, 1995, 6, p. 201-221 ; Joyce Jensen, « Silver and World Trade », New York Times, 2 décembre 2000 ; Luca Mola, The Silk Industry of Renaissance Venice, Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000 ; Debin Ma, « The Modern Silk Road : The Global Raw-Silk Market, 1850-1930 », Journal of Economic History, 56, 1996, p. 330-335.
28. Peter Coclanis cite plusieurs travaux : Anthony Reid, Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce, 1450-1680 : Volume 1. The Lands Below the Winds, Volume 2. Expansion and Crisis, Yale University Press, 2 volumes, 1988-1993 ; Eric Jones, Growth Recurring : Economic Change in World History, Clarendon Press, 1988 ; Eric Jones, Lionel Frost, et Colin White, Coming Full Circle : An Economic History of the Pacific Rim, Boulder, 1993 ; Michael Pearson, Before Colonialism : Theories on Asian-European Relations, 1500-1750, 1989 ; Michael Pearson, Port Cities and Intruders : The Swahili Coast, India, and Portugal in the Early Modern Era, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998 ; K. N. Chaudhuri, Trade and Civilisation in the Indian Ocean : An Economic History from the Rise of Islam to 1750, Cambridge University Press, 1985 ; K. N. Chaudhuri, Asia Before Europe : Economy and Civilisation of the Indian Ocean from the Rise of Islam to 1750, Cambridge University Press, 1985 ; Andre Gunder Frank, ReOrient : Global Economy in the Asian Age, University of California Press, 1998 ; Roy Bin Wong, China Transformed : Historical Change and the Limits of European Experience, Cornell University Press, 1997 ; Kenneth Pomeranz, The Great Divergence : China, Europe, and the Making of the Modern World Economy, Princeton University Press, 2000.
29. « According to quantitative data presented by Ronald Findlay and Kevin H. O’Rourke, the value of English and Dutch imports from Asia in the middle of the eighteenth century, whatever the number of English and Dutch residents there, was greater than the value of English and Dutchimports from the Americas at that time », Peter Coclanis, « Atlantic World or Atlantic/World ? », The William and Mary Quarterly, 63, 2006, p. 725-742, p. 730. Peter Coclanis évoque ici l’article de Ronald Findlay and Kevin H. O’Rourke, « Commodity Price Intégration, 1500-2000 » dans Michael Bordo, Alan Taylor, Jeffrey Williamson (dir), Globalization in Historical Perspective, National Bureau of Economie Research Conférence Report, 2003, p.13-62. Il ajoute ensuite une critique envers l’Ecole californienne : « The final point in my aforementioned 2002 critique of Atlantic history qua field related to the tendency by proponents to overestimate the centrality of Europe during the period 1500-1800 CE. I invoked the work of a variety of scholars, most notably those associated with the California School, to make the case that Asia was economically far more dynamic, wealthy, and vibrant during the early modem period than many writers had previously believed, with its most advanced régions – the lower Yangzi delta, most notably – by many standards on par with if not ahead of the most advanced régions in northwestern Europe » (Peter Coclanis, « Atlantic World or Atlantic/World ? », The William and Mary Quarterly, 63, 2006, p. 725-742, p. 734).
30. Peter Coclanis a publié plusieurs travaux sur le commerce du riz : « Rice Prices in the 1720s and the Evolution of the South Carolina Economy », Journal of Southern History, 48, 1982, p.531-544 ; « Southeast Asia’s Incorporation into the World Rice Market : A Revisionist View », Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, 24, 1993, p.251-267 ; « Distant Thunder : The Creation of a World Market in Rice and the Transformations it Wrought », American Historical Review, 98, 1993, p. 1050-1078 ; Global Networks and New Histories, Cambridge University Press, 2015. Cela l’amène à « ReOrienting Atlantic History : The Global Dimensions of the ‘Western’ Rice Trade » dans Jorge Cañizares-Esguerra et Erik Seeman (dir), The Atlantic in Global History, 1500-2000, Routledge, 2006, p. 111-127.
31. « In the early modern period the unitary ‘Atlantic world’ clearly articulated with other circuits and orbits around the globe […]. In the scheme, the Indian Ocean trade, the Manila Galleon, the Silk Road – not to mention the exchange circuits of the Mediterranean, Africa, central and eastern Europe, and the North Sea – are all conjoined in appropriate ways to goings on in and along the Atlantic Basin per se » (Peter Coclanis, « Beyond Atlantic History », dans Jack Greene, Philip Morgan, Atlantic History : a Critical Appraisal, Oxford University Press, 2009, p. 337-356, p. 349).
32. « The Atlantic of contemporary scholarship encompasses a longer history than does its predecessors ; it is also larger in its geographical, linguistic, and disciplinary purview. Broadening the Atlantic reflects a fruitful but also troubled and unresolved relationship between Atlantic and global studies over the last two decades. Particularly in the 1990s, global and international studies, world history, and globalization theory flourished. In addition, a general and worldwide perception of increasing globalization accompanied both celebrations and laments about the triumph of capitalism after the collapse of the Soviet Union. These popular debates should not all be dismissed as mere ‘global babble’ or ‘globaloney’. On the contrary, a widespread fascination with globality – the awareness of the ‘world as a whole’—helped to problematize academic area studies more generally. While area studies had offered scholars an interdisciplinary escape from the ‘tyranny of the national’, they had remained ‘parochial globalisms’ (to borrow Patrick Manning’s phrase) and were largely products of Cold War geopolitics. However, to some degree, at least, so was Atlantic history. Like earlier parochial globalisms, studies of the Atlantic could never completely satisfy those calling for more global methodologies. The significance of Atlantic developments for the wider world and the place of the Atlantic in that world remains an unresolved issue for today’s Atlanticists. I do not offer an easy resolution in this paper. Instead, my goal is to provide Atlanticists with a brief overview of the intellectual origins and evolution of their field and to suggest a periodization for Atlantic studies based on that overview. My hope is that readers and contributors to Atlantic Studies then think to situate their own research not only within the long sweep of Atlantic history but within the wider and more global spatial frames that are most appropriate for Atlantic studies in the twenty-first century », Donna Gabaccia, « A Long Atlantic in a Wider World », Atlantic Studies, 1, 2004, p. 1-27, p. 1-2.
33. Daniel White, The American Century : the Rise and Decline of the United States as a World Power, Yale University Press, 1996 ; Samuel Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, Simon & Schuster, 1997 ; Oliver Zunz, Why the American Century ?, University of Chicago Press, 1998 ; Alan Brinkley, « The Concept of the American Century », dans Laurence Moore, Maurizio Vaudagna, The American Century in Europe, Cornell University Press, 2003.
34. « A remaining challenge for Atlanticists is to reunite the somewhat separate streams of ‘red’, ‘black’ and ‘white’ Atlantic world and Atlantic economy, and to take up the equally difficult task of bringing studies of the Latin and North Atlantic into dialogue at least within the early Atlantic ‘world’. Needless to say, opportunities for connecting specialized studies of Anglophone, Francophone, and Hispanic Atlantic can be explored not only in the early Caribbean but also Atlantic-wide. Such works of synthesis, if viewed from a global perspective, would also contribute substantially to world historians’ assessments of the place of Atlantic culture in the wider world », Donna Gabaccia, « A Long Atlantic in a Wider World », Atlantic Studies, 1, 2004, p. 1-27, p. 18.
35. Sidney Mintz, Richard Price, An Anthropological Approach to the African American Past : a Caribbean Perspective, 1976. Voir aussi Sidney Mintz, Richard Price, The Birth of African-American Culture : an Anthropological Perspective, Beacon Press, 1992 ; Richard Price, « The Miracle of Creolization : a Retrospective », New West Indian Guide, 75, 2001, p. 35-64 ; Richard Price, « On the Miracle of Creolization » dans Kevin Yelvington (dir), Afro-Atlantic Dialogues : Anthropology in the Diaspora, School of American Research press, 2006, p. 115-147 ; Richard Price, « African Diaspora and Anthropology », dans Tejumola Olaniyan et James Sweet, The African Diaspora and the Disciplines, Indiana University Press, 2010, p. 53-74.
36. Robin Blackburn, The Making of New World Slavery : From the Baroque to the Modern, 1492–1800, Yale University Press, 1997.
37. Lorena Walsh, « The Chesapeake Slave Trade : Regional Patterns, African Origins and Some Implications », The William and Mary Quarterly, 58, 2001, p. 139-170 ; Stephen Behrendt, « Markets, Transaction Cycles, and Profits », The William and Mary Quarterly, 58, 2001, p. 171-204 ; David Eltis, Philip Morgan et David Richardson, « Agency and Diaspora in Atlantic History : Reassessing the African Contribution to Rice Cultivation in the Americas » American Historical Review, 112, 2007, p. 1329-1358 ; Linda Heywood, John Thornton, Central Africans, Atlantic Creoles, and the Foundation of the Americas, 1585–1660, Cambridge University Press, 2007 ; Linda Heywood, John Thornton, « Kongo and Dahomey, 1660–1815 : African Political Leadership in the Era of the Slave Trade and Its Impact on the Formation of African Identity in Brazil », dans Bernard Bailyn (dir), Bernard Bailyn, Soundings in Atlantic History : Latent Structures and Intellectual Currents, 1500-1830, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 2009, p. 86-111.
38. « The resulting deeply ingrained cultural willingness to incorporate ethnic outsiders – and the recognition that one could, if enslaved, benefit by making oneself an attractive prospect for incorporation – played out in different ways depending on variations in the size and nature of polities, the roles of imperial interlopers, and the nature of local warfare. When, for example, eighteenth-century Portuguese and then Afro-Portuguese prazeros began to extract tribute from indigenous peasantries along the Zambesi River in present-day Mozambique, they bought and armed slaves from different nonlocal peoples to enforce their colonial rule. These originally multiethnic communities of armed slaves created their own language, spiritual traditions, and rituals. In time they developed a sense of themselves as an ethnic group, becoming the Chikunda people. A similar but different process occurred in West Central Africa during the seventeenth century, when young men who were enslaved by raiders and incorporated into warrior communities took on the Imbangala identity. They captured and sold many people into Atlantic slavery, but they incorporated others into their communities in forced ethnogenesis. Other Central Africans, people enslaved in their home villages or refugees from slaving wars, coalesced in defensible highland locations, and ‘retreats from warfare frequently’ created ‘new ethnic and political identities’ », Jorge Cañizares-Esguerra, James Sibdury, « Mapping Ethnogenesis in the Early Modern Atlantic », The William and Mary Quarterly, 68, 2011, p. 181-208, p. 185-186. Les auteurs citent ici Allen Isaacman et Derek Peterson, « Making the Chikunda : Military Slavery and Ethnicity in Southern Africa, 1750–1900 », dans Christopher Leslie Brown, Philip Morgan (dir), Arming Slaves : From Classical Times to the Modern Age, Yale University Press, 2006, 95–119 ; Joseph Miller, Way of Death : Merchant Capitalism and the Angolan Slave Trade, 1730-1830, University of Wisconsin Press, 1988. Voir aussi Linda Heywood, John Thornton, Central Africans, Atlantic Creoles, and the Foundation of the Americas, 1585–1660, Cambridge University Press, 2007 ; Linda Heywood et John Thornton, « Kongo and Dahomey, 1660–1815 : African Political Leadership in the Era of the Slave Trade and Its Impact on the Formation of African Identity in Brazil », dans Bernard Bailyn (dir), Bernard Bailyn, Soundings in Atlantic History : Latent Structures and Intellectual Currents, 1500-1830, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 2009, p. 86-111.
39. « Nor were such processes in Africa limited to these admittedly unusual cases. Stephanie E. Smallwood and Alexander X. Byrd have traced the serial displacements and incorporations faced by those captured, enslaved, and traded among different indigenous peoples and then into the Atlantic world through the Bight of Biafra and the Gold Coast. Both scholars show that the kinds of cultural adaptation Mintz and Price located in the Middle Passage and the Americas are better understood to have been part and parcel of the experience of slavery within Africa. It is increasingly clear that many ethnic identities scholars have long read back onto the coastal regions of West Africa were products of slavery and diaspora. The fluid state of cultural change Byrd and Smallwood describe reached its zenith in Sierra Leone after 1808, when the British began interdicting the Atlantic trade and their African colony became home to some sixty thousand liberated recaptives. It was in Sierra Leone that dozens of mutually unintelligible linguistic groups were brought together into multiethnic agrarian communities. There they embraced charismatic forms of Protestant Christianity and English as their lingua franca and developed several identities now associated with West African ethnic nationalism: Efik, Hausa, Igbo, and Yoruba. Something similar occurred in the Americas among the seventeen thousand liberated Africans who wound up in Trinidad and the Bahamas. The multiethnic and multilingual crowds sent by the British navy to the Caribbean as indentured laborers became ‘Yorubas’ and ‘Congos’ as well as Methodist (Bahamas) and Catholic (Trinidad) English-speaking peasantries. The traditional arguments over creolization would treat those who remained Yoruba as having experienced different cultural development from those who became Methodists, but Rosanne Marion Adderly explodes this distinction in the New World just as David Northrup does in the Old World. The strikingly similar – but never identical – ethnogenesis that occurred in these different African settings points to wider pan-Atlantic patterns. Joseph C. Miller argues that precolonial Africa was characterized by the plasticity and multiplicity of socially constructed identities. This radical propinquity of Africans to invent and reshuffle social roles and networks helped the victims of Atlantic slavery adapt to the horrific oppression they faced once sold into the Americas. Whether reconstituting kith and kin, sponsoring urban mutual-aid societies, or forming mixed Afro-Amerindian communities, Africans established a wealth of racial, ethnic, and national identities in the Americas. These formulations have, once again, too often been analyzed through crude lenses that used real differences among the cultures of the enslaved to build grand comparative generalizations. It is time to step back from the generalizations and do a better job describing and mapping the differences », Jorge Cañizares-Esguerra et James Sibdury, « Mapping Ethnogenesis in the Early Modern Atlantic », The William and Mary Quarterly, 68, 2011, p. 181-208, p. 186-187. Les auteurs citent ici Stephanie Smallwood, Saltwater Slavery: A Middle Passage from Africa to American Diaspora, Harvard University Press, 2007) ; Alexander Byrd, Captives and Voyagers : Black Migrants across the Eighteenth-Century British Atlantic World, Louisiana State University Press, 2008. Pour d’autres exemples, voir Trevor Burnard, « E Pluribus Plures : African Ethnicities in Seventeenth and Eighteenth Century Jamaica », Jamaican Historical Review, 21, 2001, p. 8-22, 56-59 ;Trevor Burnard et Kenneth Morgan, « The Dynamics of the Slave Market and Slave Purchasing Patterns in Jamaica, 1655–1788 », The William and Mary Quarterly, 58, 2001, p. 205-228 ; Russell Lohse, « Slave-Trade Nomenclature and African Ethnicities in the Americas: Evidence from Early Eighteenth Century Costa Rica » Slavery and Abolition, 23, 2002, p. 73-92.
40. James Sweet, « The Quiet Violence of Ethnogenesis », The William and Mary Quarterly, 68, 2011, p. 209-214, p. 209. Il ajoute que « a sharper focus on the violence of ethnogenesis offers us a chance to move even further beyond the normative narratives of Atlantic history toward ones that capture a broader poetics of resistance and loss in the lives of Africans and Amerindians » et « Sidbury and Cañizares-Esguerra provide the tools to uncover these often-hidden histories. Their approach is especially useful in forcing us to recognize the importance of African and Amerindian contributions in the forging of the modern Atlantic world. A stronger emphasis on the violence and erasures of ethnogenesis might reveal ever more radical critiques of the Atlantic world, ones that might even question our very conception of history ». James Sweet est aussi l’auteur de Recreating Africa : Culture, Kinship, and Religion in the African-Portuguese World, 1441-1770, North Carolina University Press, 2003.
41. Amy Turner Bushnell, « Indigenous America and the Limits of the Atlantic World, 1493–1825 », dans Jack Greene et Philip Morgan, Atlantic History : A Critical Appraisal, Oxford University Press, 2009, p. 191–221.
42. « Most scholars have been unable to envision the whole, daunted by the challenges of mastering multiple languages and historiographies. The cross-field collaboration of Sidbury and Cañizares-Esguerra suggests a means to meet these challenges. The essay this collaboration has produced would seem to point the way to a new Atlantic history […]. The idea of ethnogenesis as Sidbury and Cañizares-Esguerra deploy it may work best for the groups itw as not primarily designed to describe : Euro-Americans, those relatively empowered by Atlantic dynamics », Patrick Griffin, « A Plea for a New Atlantic History », The William and Mary Quarterly, 68, 2011, p. 236-239, p. 237-238.
43. George Marcus, « Ethnography in/of the World System : the Emergence of a Multi-Sited Ethnography », Annual Review of Anthropology, 1995, p. 95-117, p. 99.
44. David Eltis,« Atlantic History in Global Perspective », Itinerario, 23, 1999, p. 141-161, p. 141.
45. « Indeed, one of the principal products of scholarly endeavour on colonial British America over the past generation is the better appreciation of the importance to Britain of their presence in the Caribbean relative to that in their colonies on mainland America whose only significant contribution to increasing the wealth of the home country—which remained the ultimate seventeenth-century justification of all colonies—was fish from Newfoundland and tobacco from the Chesapeake. The value of each of these commodities was small compared with the value of sugar produced on the island colonies. Indeed the mainland colonies were to increase in relative importance in the minds of merchants and British officials over the course of the eighteenth century only because the demand for provisions to feed the escalating slave population in the Caribbean provided a new raison d’être for the mainland colonies. Also eighteenth-century commercial and communications factors made it possible for the mainland colonies to become suppliers of food to the expanding population of Western Europe. These developments explain the major expansion in the number of European agricultural and artisanal settlers who went to settle in Britain’s mainland colonies over the course of the eighteenth century. However, it would be teleological to suggest that this important development, which transformed the character of settlement in parts of mainland British America, could have been anticipated in previous centuries », (Nicholas Canny, Philip Morgan (dir), The Oxford Handbook of the Atlantic World, Oxford University Press, 2013, p. 9-10).
46. Jorge Cañizares-Esguerra, « The Core and Peripheries of our National Narratives : a Response from IH-35 », American Historical Review, 112, 2007, p. 1423-1431.
47. C’est par exemple le cas dans les travaux de l’historien Timothy Breen, qui soutient que les îles des Caraïbes sont insignifiantes pour le droit naturel tel qu’il se diffuse dans l’empire britannique à l’époque moderne ; dans l’ouvrage de Stanley Katz, John Murrin et Douglas Greenburg, Colonial America : Essays in Politics and Social Development, Routledge, 1971 ; dans l’ouvrage de Jerome Reich, Colonial America, Routledge, 1984 ; dans l’ouvrage de Ronald Dufour, Colonial America, West Publishing Company, 1994 ; dans l’ouvrage de Karen Ordahl Kupperman, Major Problems in American Colonial History, Wadsworth Cengage Learning, 2013. A l’inverse, quelques chercheurs se sont intéressés aux Caraïbes britanniques : Edward Braithwaite, The Development of Creole Society in Jamaica, 1770-1820, Oxford University Press, 1971 ; Andrew O’Shaughnessy, « The Stamp Act Crisis in the British Caribbean », The William and Mary Quarterly, 51, 1994, p.203-26 ; Selwyn Carrington, « West Indian Opposition to British Policy : Barbadian Politics, 1774-1782 », Journal of Caribbean History, 17, 1982, p.26-49 ; Selwyn Carrington, « The American Revolution and the British West Indies’ Economy », Journal of Interdisciplinary History, 17, 1987, p.823-50 ; Selwyn Carrington, The British West Indies during the American Revolution : A Study in Colonial Economy and Politics, Brill, 1988.
48. Jack Greene, « Beyond Power : Paradigm Subversion and Reformulation and the Re-Creation of the Early Modern Atlantic World » dans Darlene Clark Hine, Jacqueline McLeod (dir), Crossing Boundaries : Comparative History of Black People in Diaspora, Indiana University Press, 1992, p. 319-342 ; Jack Greene, « Comparing Early Modern American Worlds : Some Reflections on the Promise of a Hemispheric Perspective », History Compass, 1, 2003 ; Jack Greene, « Early Modern Southeastern North America and the Broader Atlantic and American Worlds », Journal of Southern History, 73, 2007, p. 525-538 ; Jack Greene, « Hemispheric history and Atlantic History », dans Jack Greene et Philip Morgan (dir), Atlantic History : a Critical Appraisal, Oxford University Press, 2009, p. 299-315 ; Peter Wood, « From Atlantic History to a Continental Approach », dans Jack Greene et Philip Morgan (dir), Atlantic History : a Critical Appraisal, Oxford University Press, 2009, p. 279-298 ; Jorge Cañizares-Esguerra, How to Write this History of the New World : Histories, Epistemologies, and Identities in the Eighteenth Century Atlantic World, Stanford University Press, 2001 ; Jorge Cañizares-Esguerra, « Some Caveats about the ‘Atlantic’ Paradigm », History Compass, 1, 2003, p. 1-4.
49. « The rise of ethnohistory and the interest in indigenous peoples, the reexamination of African slavery, the focus on women’s history and gender defi nitions, the exploration of transatlantic intellectual connections in political, economic, social, educational, and religious life, the turn to cultural history and the emergence of creole or American cultural systems and identities, and perhaps even the development of a new interest in the history of secondary centers and peripheral areas in the Americas », Jack Greene, « Hemispheric History and Atlantic History », dans Jack Greene et Philip Morgan (dir), Atlantic History : a Critical Appraisal, Oxford University Press, 2009, p. 299-315, p. 303. Voir aussi Joyce Chaplin, « Expansion and Exceptionalism in Early American History », Journal of American History, 89, 2003, p. 1431-1455, p. 1447-1450.
50. Jack Greene, « Hemispheric History and Atlantic History », dans Jack Greene et Philip Morgan (dir), Atlantic History : a Critical Appraisal, Oxford University Press, 2009, p. 299-315, p. 307-308.
51. Herbert Bolton, « The Epic of Greater America », American Historical Review, 38, 1933, p. 448-474 ; Max Savelle, The Foundations of American Civilization : a History of Colonial America, 1942 ; Silvio Zavala, The Colonial Period in the History of the New World, 1962 ; Guillermo Moron (dir), Historia General de América : Periodo Colonial (11 volumes), Academia Nacional de la Historia de Venezuela, 1987 ; John Elliott, Empires of the Atlantic World : Britain and Spain in America, 1492-1830, Yale University Press, 2007
52. Jack greene, « Hemispheric History and Atlantic History », dans Jack Greene et Philip Morgan (dir), Atlantic History : a Critical Appraisal, Oxford University Press, 2009, p. 299-315, en particulier p. 306-310 ; voir aussi Mark Sheaves, « The Anglo-Iberian Atlantic as a Hemispheric System ? English Merchants Navigating the Iberian Atlantic », dans Jorge Cañizares-Esguerra (dir), Entangled Empires. The Anglo-Iberian Atlantic, 1500-1830, University of Pennsylvania Press, 2018, p. 19-41.
53. Jack greene, « Hemispheric History and Atlantic History », dans Jack Greene et Philip Morgan (dir), Atlantic History : a Critical Appraisal, Oxford University Press, 2009, p. 299-315, p. 310-312.